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Introduction
Over the last decades, numerous studies have investigated the impact of colonialism on the recent development. A number of works analyze the long-term e¤ects of colonialism on economic development (Acemoglu et al., 2001 and 2002; head et al., 2010; Mizuno and Okazawa, 2009) or political development (Lange, 2003; Olsson, 2009 ). To the best knowledge, this paper o¤ers a …rst attempt to explore how colonialism a¤ects the allocative e¢ ciency of …nancial policies. Motivated by the research question, this paper will show that liberal colonialism de…ned by Lange et al. (2006) creates an institutional comparative advantage this day to promote the e¢ ciency of …nancial policies on capital allocation. Therefore, we contribute by enhancing the understanding of colonialism and economic institutions. This paper uses the World Bank Investment Climate Survey undertaken in 2005 for China to investigate the e¤ect of interest with novelty. First, following the approach of Lange et al. (2006) , we exploit the history of China's colonialism with qualitative evidence to identify that a bit more than half of surveyed cities experienced liberal colonialism during 1896-1911.
This research avoids the limitation of cross-country studies; it explores the colonial power in the same country to control for the impacts of heterogeneity in the political system, culture and other macro factors.
Second, the existing literature does not measure the allocative e¢ ciency of …nancial policies, but we refer to Wurgler's method (2000) to estimate it by the elasticity of value added on the (positive) change of …nancial access. Because …nancial policies should allocate capitals to growing …rms, the higher elasticity re ‡ects the better capital allocation of …nancial policies. In particular, to the best of our knowledge, only the survey captures the information on a …rm's …nancial-access change due to the gov-ernment's …nancial policies. This may explain why the existing literature does not investigate the allocative e¢ ciency of …nancial policies.
We follow the methodology of Acemoglu et al. (2008) to explore the persistent e¤ect of liberal colonialism. First, we conduct the reduced-form estimates to show that …nancial policies in 2004 have higher e¢ ciency on capital allocation in the cities that are historically controlled by liberal colonists during 1896-1911. Because our proxy for liberal colonialism may include other noise, we further control for confounding factor and …nd that confounders are insigni…cantly related to outcome variables. We also conduct the test suggested by Altonji et al. (2005) to reveal that the omitted-variables bias is negligible. These …ndings jointly indicate that the e¤ect of liberal colonialism on the allocative e¢ ciency of …nancial policies tends to 1 be robust to the potential endogeneity bias.
Second, we conduct instrumental variable (hereafter IV) estimation to test whether liberal colonialism a¤ects the allocative e¢ ciency of …nancial policy through the quality of economic institutions (hereafter, institutional quality). For one thing, we …nd that institutional quality instrumented by liberal colonialism is signi…cantly and positively related to the allocative e¢ ciency. For another, we conduct a series of tests to con…rm that liberal colonialism has no direct e¤ect on the allocative e¢ ciency except through institutional quality. Our IV estimates document that liberal colonialism during 1896-1911 creates a variation in institutional quality to causally promote the allocative e¢ ciency of …nancial policies in 2004.
Despite theoretical contribution, this paper o¤ers applications to historically colonized countries. As Wurgler (2000: 188) points out, "a fundamental job of the economy is to allocate capital e¢ ciently." This paper suggests that most developing countries need to design their …nancial policies with consideration of their sources of economic institutions.
By contrast with the existing literature such as Legal Original Theory (La Porta et al., 1997 Porta et al., , 1998 and 2008) using the source of economic institutions to explain the development of the …nancial sector, this paper shed insight on the allocative e¢ ciency of …nancial policies. 1 If we assume that the liberal colonialism during 1896-1911 is exogenous for the allocative e¢ ciency of …nancial policies in 2004, we can expect a causal e¤ect of the former on the latter. In fact, we will theoretically justify the assumption in Section 2 and empirically con…rm it in later instrumental varia-ble estimations. For the cautiousness, we here use "tends to be" instead of "is."
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The next section introduces the research background and explains our hypothesis. Section 3 introduces data and describes the measurement of variables. Section 4 conducts the reduced-form estimations to investigate the direct e¤ect of liberal colonial-ism, whereas Section 5 conducts IV estimations to examine the indirect e¤ect of in-terest through institutional quality. Section 6 concludes.
Liberal colonialism as exogenous source of economic institutions in China
In ancient China, the government adopts authority to govern the society instead of laws.
After more than 2000 years, the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) has developed the centralization of politics in peak condition. Speci…cally, laws are only used to maintain governance and guarantee the authority of the state. Thus, the public pin the hope of the enforcement of laws and contracts on honest and upright o¢ cials instead of institutions.
The authority-centered governance is destroyed by colonial powers at the end of the nineteenth century. After a series of defeats, the Qing government was forced to allow colonial powers into China during 1896-1899. Within their respective domains of control, the colonial powers imposed their own civil administration, including legal and police systems (Dong et al., 2000) . It is worth noting that colonial power is divided into two types. As Lang et al. (2006) de…nes, one is the mercantilist colonialism that establishes extractive institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2001) ; the other one is liberal colonialism that introduces inclusive institutions (Acemoglu, et al., 2012 ).
The historical distribution of colonial power in China
With reference to the history, we can identify that the colonial powers of France and Russia were extractive. The former controlled Yunnan, Hainan, Guangxi, and the majority of Guangdong province; the latter controlled Xinjiang, Mongolia, and the three north-eastern provinces (Qian, 1948) . French colonists planned to establish a prospective settlement, but their colonial power was mainly used for opium trades, pornography businesses and gambling abuse. The resources were extracted and transferred to develop their colonial settlement in Vietnam. Russia had settlement in Northern China, but the Qing government succeeded to regain the territories soon. More particularly, Russia colonists were so greedy to extract economic resources that they conducted massacre laids in their controlled regions. Thus, Russia colonists do not introduce inclusive institutions to their controlled regions, neither.
By contrast, the other regions controlled by the Great Britain (Guizhou, Sichuan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Anhui, Jiangsu, Henan, and Zhejiang provinces), Germany (Shandong province) and Japan (Fujian province) were developed for liberalization. 2 There may be some small-scale political con ‡icts at the early stage in these controlled regions, but the colonialism in these regions bred economic institutions for later development. For one thing, foreign powers forced the Qing government to assign treaties to protect their business in China; thus, the Qing government could not expropriate the business attached with foreigners.
The foreign investments and properties started to be legally protected. Because domestic investors can seek connections with foreigners, the protection generated positive externality for the investment climate. For another, lawsuits in these regions were adjudicated with reference to the legal systems of respective reigning foreign powers (e.g., Yang and Ye, 1993; Tan, 1996) . Thus, the spirit of contract in the western institutions is introduced in these regions. 2 In fact, Shanghai and Tianjin are also settlements. We do not include them because they are governed by multiple colonists so that cannot be identi…ed objectively as mercantilist or liberal colonialism. Moreover, Japan's colonialism during 1931-1945 is mercantilist colonialism, but its militarism was still constrained in its early colonialism process in the later Qing dynasty. More practically, we can drop the Japan colonial power in the period and our results are robust. 6 
Hypotheses: the persistent e¤ect of liberal colonialism
Given the above historical background, we can measure liberal colonialism with the identities of colonial powers and the qualitative evidence. Speci…cally, we construct the dummy for those regions controlled by the Great Britain, Germany and Japan, i.e., the dummy for liberal colonialism. We argue that liberal colonialism is an exogenous source of economic institutions for following two reasons. Given the above argument, we …rst predict that liberal colonialism introduces modern economic institutions and then endows an institutional comparative advantage to the cities historically a¤ected by liberal colonialism. This prediction is in line with the theory of institutional comparative advantage (Levchenko, 2007 and 2013) . Speci…cally, liberal colonists forced the Qing government "to uphold private property, encourage commercial production, and enforce the rule of law" for their sake (Lang, 2006 (Lang, : 1416 ; but they created the …rst institutional shock to constrain governmental expropriation in China's history. 3 Second, we expect that the institutional comparative advantage promotes the allocation of credit (Djank et al., 2007), which is more generally the conclusion of the law-and-economics literature (e.g., La Porta., 1997, 1998 and 2008).
To combine the above expectations, we hypothesize that liberal colonialism promotes the allocative e¢ ciency through economic institutions. We will test whether (1) 
The measurement of the allocative e¢ ciency
We follow Wurgler's approach (2000) to measure the allocative e¢ ciency of the …nancial policies as the following.
where 4F A is the change (i.e., improvement) of the surveyed …rm's …nancial access, whereas Given that 4F A is measured on a scale, we use Ordinal Logit (Ologit) method for estimations to obtain the allocative e¢ ciency measures of 120 surveyed cities. For robustness, we also use Ordinal Least Square (OLS) method. The corresponding measure of the allocative e¢ ciency will lead to the same …nding. As Table 1 presents, the allocative e¢ ciency generated by OLS seems signi…cantly less than that by Ologit method, but Table 2 shows that the former is highly related to the latter, i.e., the correlation coe¢ cient equals 0.963. More formally, we will show in Section 4 that the former will generate the same …nding as the latter does.
[Insert Tables 1-2 about here]
Liberal colonialism
As explained in Section 2, we construct a dummy to measure liberal colonialism with the identity of the city. If the city was controlled by the Great Britain, Germany and Japan during the late Qing dynasty, the dummy equals to 1. Speci…cally, these colo-nists controlled provinces including Guizhou, Sichuan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Anhui, Jiangsu, Henan, Zhejiang, Shandong and Fujian since 1896-1899 to 1911. When the surveyed …rm is located in a city of those provinces, we can identify the …rm is embed in a city historically controlled by liberal colonists.
As Table 1 show, there are a bit more than half of surveyed cities were historically controlled by liberal colonialism; i.e., the mean of the dummy equals 0.576. Recall that the survey we use randomly samples …rms but select the cities on the basis of the economic size.
Thus, the dummy indicates liberal colonialism is signi…cant for China's development. 
The quality of economic institutions

Control variables
We 
Liberal colonialism and the allocative e¢ ciency
This section estimates the reduced-form relationship between liberal colonialism during 1896-1899 and the allocative e¢ ciency of …nancial policies in 2004. We conduct a series of tests to verify that the potential endogeneity bias is negligible. Thus, the relationship of interest tends to be robust.
Baseline estimates
We conduct the regression according to the following equation to estimate the rela-tionship between liberal colonialism and the allocative e¢ ciency.
where AE is the outcome of interest, the allocative e¢ ciency of …nancial policies in 2004. LC is the dummy for liberal colonialism, the variable of interest. Z is the set of control variables at the city level, as introduced before. We adopt robust standard errors or cluster the standard errors at the province level. Given the allocative e¢ ciency is positive or negative, we just use Ordinal Least Squares (OLS) for estimations.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
As Columns 1-2 of Table 3 show, liberal colonialism is negatively and signi…cantly related to the allocative e¢ ciency estimated under Ologit method. For robustness, we also use the allocative e¢ ciency generated by the OLS method. OLS method is ine¢ cient to estimate the elasticity for the measurement of outcome, but as Columns 3-4 shows, the coe¢ cient of interest is also negatively signi…cant at least 10% level.
Moreover, most control variables are insigni…cant; only distance to the port is positively and weakly signi…cant. The poor explanation of our control variables partially be explained by the fact that we only control for relatively exogenous variables to avoid the bad-control issue (see Angrist and Pischke, 2008 show that the endogeneity bias due to omitted variables is unlikely to o¤set the e¤ect of interest under our baseline estimates.
Robustness to measurement errors or confounding factors
Our measure of liberal colonialism follows the standard approach, but we admit that the measurement is imperfect such that the e¤ect of liberal colonialism may be confounded by other factors. This subsection controls for additional variables to isolate the e¤ect of liberal colonialism on the allocative e¢ ciency.
where W is the set of additional controls that may confound the variable of interest. Considering these confounding factors tend to be endogenous, we do not control for them in the Considering that highway may be invested by more than one cities, we also measure the local state capacity by using the information on roads.
As Columns 1-4 of Table 4 shows, the local state capacity, measured by either highways or roads, is insigni…cantly related to the allocative e¢ ciency.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
After the colonialism, China has another institutional shock to liberalize its economies. 
Robustness to omitted variables
We test the potential bias due to omitted variables as Altonji et al. With reference to the coe¢ cients of liberal colonialism in Equations (2) and (3) to calculate the ratio, a 2 =ja 1 a 2 j, to test the bias from omitted variables. In words of Nunn and Wantchekon (2011: 3238), the higher is the ratio, "the less the estimate is a¤ected by selection on observables, and the stronger selection on unobservables [i.e., omitted variables] needs to be (relative to observables) to explain away the entire e¤ect."
[Insert Table 5 about here]
We report the results in is less likely that the estimated e¤ect of interest is consistently and fully driven by omitted variables.
This section estimates the e¤ect of liberal colonialism during 1896-1899 on the allocative e¢ ciency of …nancial policies in 2004. We just conduct reduced-form estimations here, but we use tests to justify the endogneity concern due to the measurement errors, confounders or omitted variables is negligible. To formally test the causal e¤ect of liberal colonialism and its channel on economic institutions, we will use IV estimations in the next section.
Liberal colonialism, economic institutions and the allocative e¢ ciency
To examine whether liberal colonialism as the historical source of economic institutions causally promotes the allocative e¢ ciency, we conduct IV estimations.
First-stage estimates: liberal colonialism as an exogenous source of economic institutions
To verify the exogeneity of liberal colonialism for the allocative e¢ ciency rather than economic institutions, we conduct the following regressions.
where IQ in Equation (4) is the institutional quality at the city level in 2004. Equation (4) test whether liberal colonialism is related to the institutional quality in 2004; the coe¢ cient of 1 is expected to be signi…cantly positive. By contrast, we follow Acemoglu et al. (2002) to conduct a test for the exclusion restriction. Specially, we examine whether the liberal colonialism has no signi…cant impact on allocative e¢ ciency except through institutional quality (Equation (5)). The coe¢ cient of f is expected to be insigni…cant. We also use robust or clustered standard errors as before.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
We report the corresponding results in Table 6 . As the table shows, liberal colonialism indeed is signi…cantly and positively related to institutional quality (see Columns 1-2). In particular, F statistics of the …rst-stage estimates are larger than 10. As Columns 3-4
show, liberal colonialism becomes insigni…cant after liberal colonialism being controlled for.
Thus, liberal colonialism should be an exogenous IV of institutional quality for the allocative e¢ ciency.
Second-stage estimates
We conduct second stage estimates according to the following equation.
where IQ is the …tted value of IQ, which is estimated from Equation (4). As expected, the coe¢ cient of is signi…cantly positive as the coe¢ cient of a 1 in Equation (2) to be. As Table 7 shows, institutional quality is signi…cantly and positively related to the allocative e¢ ciency, irrespective of robust or clustered standard errors being adopted. Thus, the e¤ect of institutional quality deriving from the liberal colonialism causally promotes the allocative e¢ ciency. Put it di¤erently, liberal colonialism promotes the allocative e¢ ciency through the quality of economic institutions, thereby con…rming our second hypothesis.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
Moreover, all of controls under 2nd-stage estimations obtain the same signs under the baseline estimations. At the same time, as the baseline estimates show, only the coe¢ cient of distance to the port is moderately signi…cant as before. This reveals that our estimates are highly robust to the potential endogneity bias.
Additionally, we also conduct use second-stage estimations to further tests for the assumption of the exclusion restriction. Speci…cally, we regress the residuals from the second-stage estimations on our IV. If our IV a¤ects allocative e¢ ciency only through institutional quality, the former should be not correlated with the latter. As a result, the IV had no signi…cant impact on the residuals (see Columns 3-4).
Conclusions
With evidence from China, this paper documents that liberal colonialism has a positive subsequent impact on the allocative e¢ ciency of …nancial policies. This paper contributes by o¤ering a deep understanding of colonialism in long-term developmental trajectories.
Most of the existing literature either divides colonialism as settler colonialism and extractive colonialism (Acemoglu et al., 2001) or direct colonialism and indirect colonialism (e.g., Lang, 2004) ; by contrast, this paper follows a new divi-sion with mercantilist colonialism and liberal colonialism (Lang et al., 2006) . To the best of our knowledge, we contribute a …rst empirical analysis on the impact of liberal colonialism on allocative e¢ ciency.
Given that the liberal colonialism in China's history is theoretically exogenous, we …rst conduct reduced-form estimations to show that liberal colonialism is positively related to the allocative e¢ ciency in 2004 of …nancial policies. We especially adopt tests to verify that the endogneity bias due to the endogeneity concern is negligible. More specially, we conduct IV estimations to document that liberal colonialism as the exogenous source of the quality of economic institutions in 2004 causally promotes the allocative e¢ ciency in 2004.
In particular, we also directly test the exclusion restriction of liberal colonialism as the instrument of the quality of economic institutions for the allocative e¢ ciency and con…rm that the e¤ect of liberal colonialism persists to this day only through economic institutions. 
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